Will President Sandu Win Reelection This Fall?
Moldova is set to hold presidential elections on October 20, 2024. There are reasons to be cautiously optimistic about Sandu’s chances of reelection: the president’s approval rating reportedly increased from 40 percent in 2022 to 46 percent in 2023, and current polls put her ahead of the opposition candidate Igor Dodon, the leader of the pro-Russian Party of Socialists. At the same time, the electoral margins appear worryingly thin compared with 2020. A December 2023 poll shows Sandu leading the presidential race 30 percent to 24 percent over Dodon, who has gained 8 percentage points since September. Yet although she is projected to win the first round, Sandu is projected to lose the second—not only to Dodon (35 percent to 46 percent) but also to the next-highest-ranking opposition candidate, Ion Ceban (34 percent to 42 percent).
The situation is especially precarious in light of Russia’s disruption of previous elections and the uncovering of a Kremlin-backed coup plot in early 2023. The stakes of this election virtually guarantee Russian destabilization efforts, either to rig the results in Dodon’s favor or, in the case of a PAS victory, to discredit the electoral outcome. Moldovan authorities and independent media investigators have exposed the extent of Russia’s interference campaign, which includes cyberattacks, weaponized disinformation, and Russian-sponsored public protests. The “unprecedented levels of Russian interference” in Moldova’s recent local elections can be considered a test run for larger-scale disruption efforts this fall. The information war within Moldova ultimately favors Russia, not Moldova. Since the country’s independence, Moldovan institutions have been weak—victims of Russian undermining, plundering by oligarchs, and the brain drain of mass emigration. These challenges have weakened the pro-reform government’s ability to counter malign narratives. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that many of Moldova’s native Russian speakers look to Russian sources for their news. Even though the Kremlin-backed news channels were banned in Moldova in mid-2022, the replacement of these networks with more balanced Russian-language programming has been slow.
Will Moldova’s Economic Opening with the European Union and Reform Agenda Continue to Progress?
Other than the outcome of the upcoming presidential election, Moldova’s near-term future hinges on its ongoing economic opening with the European Union and its ability to execute the requisite reforms that will keep the country on track for EU accession. By all accounts, Moldova’s progress toward European integration is the one area in which Sandu and the PAS have seen “unmitigated success,” but the slow pace of institutional reforms has left the public agitated. The high hopes that followed the PAS’s initial victory have now been offset by several years of turbulence. Since 2020, Moldovan society has been rocked by the Covid-19 pandemic, an energy crisis, an influx of Ukrainian refugees, supply chain disruptions, and the loss of traditional markets. Taken together, these challenges have overshadowed the government’s comparatively subtle steps toward long-term development. Like Ukraine, Moldova’s path to EU membership is steep, requiring major administrative, political, judicial, and economic reforms, as well as the alignment of domestic laws and standards with those of the European Union. These major structural changes will take time to crystallize; as growing pains test public patience and put pressure on Sandu, the country’s visible rapprochement with the European Union has become her strongest source of political capital. Sandu’s pledge to make Moldova “a full member of the European family by 2030” appears more in reach than ever: although Moldova remains in an “early stage” of the reform process, the European Commission’s approval of the country’s liberal trajectory prompted the European Council to open formal accession negotiations with both Moldova and Ukraine on December 14, 2023.
If domestic reforms and deeper economic engagement with Europe continue to move forward without further disruptions, Moldova’s entry into the European Union by 2030 might be possible. Russian subversion efforts have not managed to dim public support for the bloc: recent polls conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) found that 63 percent of Moldova’s population pins the country’s future on EU membership, and 67 percent ranks the European Union as Moldova’s most important economic partner. Forty-two percent of adults also believe that Moldova is moving in the right direction—a 14-point increase from IRI’s 2022 poll and the highest it has been in nearly a decade. Given the divisions within Moldovan society and the volatility of its political landscape, Sandu has moved to capitalize on favorable winds by announcing a referendum on EU accession this November. By focusing the government’s efforts on her most popular issue, Sandu is more likely to assuage those whose support for EU integration outweighs any current dissatisfaction with the PAS. One of the reasons that polling on EU membership is higher than PAS favorability is the fact that many Russian speakers, including some of Transnistria’s leaders and business elite, stand to benefit from European integration and are supportive of deeper EU-Moldovan relations. In light of Moldovan ambivalence toward Russia and the risks of a pro-Russian backlash, the European Union can support Moldova’s trajectory by prioritizing accession talks, extending support for ongoing reforms, and making additional efforts to strengthen EU-Moldovan trade, thereby offering the population a preview of the advantages of EU membership.
Will Moldova Handle a Slow-Motion Energy Crisis Coming in December 2024?
Until recently, Moldova sourced 100 percent of its energy from Russian gas delivered through Ukraine to Transnistria, the site of the country’s only power plant. Although Transnistria received the gas for free, with associated revenues constituting the bulk of the region’s income, Russia billed the Moldovan government for the costs. This arrangement gave Russia an annual opportunity to strong-arm Moldova for concessions by dangling the threat of price hikes and throttled gas supplies. The unbundling of Moldova’s energy sector became a top government priority after the invasion of Ukraine, which plunged Moldova into its worst energy crisis since its independence. Last fall, the government broke Moldova’s dependence on Russian gas by drawing on a pipeline running through Romania, and it also conducted an audit that disproved the country’s debt to Russian energy giant Gazprom.
These efforts have dashed Russia’s “gas blackmail” in all but one area: 70 percent of Moldova’s electricity still comes from the Russian gas-powered plant in Transnistria. While the path toward long-term energy independence—including the development of renewable energy alternatives—will take time, more immediate efforts can be made to accelerate Moldova’s integration into the European energy grid through projects such as the EU-backed construction of new electric transmission lines between Moldova and Romania. Current initiatives will need to accelerate before the year’s end: Russia’s contract with Ukraine to transport gas via pipelines in Ukrainian territory will expire on December 31, 2024, and failure to replace it could trigger a second energy crisis and mass emigration. Furthermore, because Transnistria will no longer be receiving heavily subsidized Russian gas, the potential collapse of the region’s economy risks leaving Moldova with another refugee crisis that it is ill equipped to handle, as Transnistria’s residents pour over the banks of the Nistru river in search of opportunities. The international community must make every effort to ensure the operability of new electricity networks, help Romania increase its electricity production, and support Moldova’s own domestic capacity. This planning and negotiation must include Transnistria, both in negotiation with Transnistrian leaders to continue using the region’s electrical plant with gas supplied from non-Russian sources and in ensuring that there is a plan to help support the Transnistrian economy.
Conclusion
Western investments in both Ukraine and Moldova over the next several months have an enormous potential for return—a democratic and prosperous Moldova supports a free and open Eastern Europe, and Moldova’s pro-Western government offers a strategic opportunity to usher a country deprived of democracy into the European fold and create a template for good governance in the region. The end state for Moldova is a flourishing democracy with a strong GDP, resilient institutions, energy independence, full EU membership, and the protection of regional security partnerships with Romania and Ukraine.
Daniel F. Runde is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Thomas Bryja is a research assistant and program coordinator with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.
This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report.
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Publish date : 2024-06-10 15:23:14
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